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Cases and Materials an Corporate Reorganization. By William 0.
Douglas and Carrol i. Shanks. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
1931. pp. x, 559. $6.
YALE LAW SCHOOL is a center of adventurous thinldng. Here we have new
matter in a new manner. Here a group of young self-styled iconoclasts are
conducting one of the first major experiments in legal education since the
introduction of the case system at Harvard more than a generation ago.
They have hung up the motto of Danton "Always Audacious." They have
abolished the conventional course on Corporations, and have substituted a
series of courses collectively called Business Units, of which Reorganizations
is part. They sum up this new educational audacity under the term the
"functional approach system." This innovation accounts in part for the
comment that one sometimes hears in New York from the elder generation
of lawyers that these young realists are on a fair way towards ruining a
good law school, or, from the more charitable of us, that they are unfortu-
nately trying to accomplish what can only properly be done in a post graduate
law school. Little has been written about the system, and little dare be
written by outsiders as its exponents have wielded a vitriolic pen against
the few who have essayed to explain it. See, for example, "Some Realism
About Realism" ' replying to Dean Pound's article on the young realists.:
It is with a due degree of trepidation therefore that a mere scrivener of
corporate mortgages should venture upon ground preeimpted by the philoso-
phers of the law. This book, however, is part and parcel of, and can be
reviewed only in connection with, the new system. But first a word about
the book itself.
This little volume on Corporate Reorganization is indeed the case book of
the hour. With the work of many a corporate law office cut out for the next
five years, whether or not the depression soon subsides, with the problems of
the depression and its aftermath, it would seem that the students of this
course should be especially equipped to assist in these immediate matters,
if they are fortunate enough to secure a position during that period. The
book is an admirable collection of cases covering the field of corporate re-
organization from the formation of the protective committee for security
holders to the consummation of the Plan and Agreement of Reorganization
with the foreclosure sale and the issuance and distribution of the securities
of the "New Company;" and, in between, the many and vexatious problems
of equity receiverships, receiver's certificates, hold-out and hold-up minori-
ties, the upset price, the necessity of a judicial sale and the fairness of the
Plan. Young Wall Street lawyers have for a decade taken the lectures of
Byrne and Cravath 3 as their Bible in this field. It would be high praise
to recommend this work as an almost indispensable companion volume.
I Lewellyn, Some Realism About Rcal-sm-RcspondbW to Dcan Poznd
(1931) 44 HAnv. L. REv. 1222.
2 Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 H,%Rv. L. REV.
697.
3 STETSON and others-Som. LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917).
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Certainly no one can presume to be learned in this specialty without a degree
of acquaintance with matters covered by most of the 70 cases contained in
the volume. It could have been expanded indefinitely except for the limita-
tions of a 24 hour undergraduate course for which it was prepared. The
annotations and references to recent Law Journal articles make it of added
value to the practitioner. While it is true that practicing lawyers refuse
to buy or read case books, this book should be made an exception, as it deals
with a field not covered by any legal text book, and a field in which the
cases themselves must be read. A contributing factor to the excellency of
the work is the fact that Professor Douglas formerly was, and that Mr.
Shanks now is, actively engaged in the practice of law in this field, both
having been associated with leading New York offices specializing in cor-
porate reorganization.
The functional approach system is an attempt to synchronize education
more closely with life. It is part of an educational ferment extending from
the pre-kindergarten to the university, Professor John Dewey being one of
the leaders of the movement. He believes that in an industrial society the
school should be a miniature workshop and a miniature country; it should
teach through practice, and through trial and error, the acts and discipline
necessary for economic and social order and he would apply to our social
problems the experimental methods and attitudes which have succeeded so
well in the sciences.4 My initial reaction to the Yale experiment is akin to
the shock I received when my six-year-old son reported that in his first grade
school 5 one-half of the children were to take daily typewriting lessons, while
the other half would learn to read in the usual manner. At the end of the
term results will be compared and the experiment modified or abandoned.
Dozens of such experiments are tried each year in the various grades and
the apparently more successful ones are being adopted in the public schools
throughout the country, and even in Moscow.0 In the law school the case
system itself was a great step forward, when compared with the text book
system, in gearing up education with reality. But the case book system
gears it up to the life of an appellate lawyer, while the average corporate
practitioner in New York City sees the Appellate Division for the first and
the last time when he is admitted to the bar. The functional approach is
merely another step. In the conventional course on Corporations weeks were
spent on such subjects as de facto corporations, corporations solo, ultra
vires and the nature of the corporate entity. In fourteen years of corporate
practice I have never met a de facto corporation and have encountered only
one corporation sole, the Bishop of Chicago, and that only when a bank
clerk innocently wrote for a copy of its certificate of incorporation. The new
method would eliminate the study of case after case on ultra vircs, and
would hand the student instead an actual copy of a modern corporate
charter with a ten-page paragraph setting forth the corporation's powers,
and would have him try to imagine any act that could be ultra vires under
that corporation's charter. In the course on Reorganizations at Yale the
students have obtained the Deposit Agreements of the various Protective
Committees of the numerous classes of bonds and stocks of the Seaboard
Air Line Railway Company now in receivership. They have divided them-
selves into Protective Committees, and are about to form a Reorganization
Committee and promulgate a Plan of Reorganization for the railroad.
While this Yale experiment may seem radical in the field of legal educa-
tion where important changes scarcely average one to a generation, when
4 DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1926) 567, 569.
5 Horace Mann School, one of the experimental schools of Teachers Col-
lege, Columbia.
6 WOODY, NEW MINDS: NEW MEN, (1932).
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considered in the light of the marked educational advances in our elementary
schools, our high schools and our colleges in both matter and methods, it
seems only timidly adventurous. It supplements but does not discard the
case book. Some future Dewey experimentalist will completely discard the
case book for half a class and compare examination results with the other
half; and we need not be surprised to find the law school of the future
supplementing certain courses with the educational motion picture. I would
seriously suggest the experiment for those students bent on becoming cor-
porate lawyers of abolishing the moot courts and substituting a corporation
club. At one of its semi-monthly meetings a small group, each individual
with a separate task, could go through the form of incorporating a new
company, holding the first meeting of incorporators and directors, qualifying
it to transact business in several States by filling out the actual forms,
qualifying under the blue sky laws of several other States, and listing the
securities on the Boston Stock Exchange. And to make it duplicate more
nearly the experience of a New York office they might hold an occasional
midnight meeting. Perhaps not much would be learned, but many a student
who, like myself, had never seen a stock certificate or a corporate bond,
would have opened up to him an entirely new horizon and be taken out of
the mental fog into which he occasionally lands in some of the courses. The
reviewer feels that the office with which he is associated has made a material
contribution to this approach by employing for two or three months each
summer a group of second year law students who are given the opportunity
not only of seeing a stock certificate but even of seeing the New York Stock
Exchange and other institutions in action.
As a conventional case book I have only the highest praise for this book;
as an instrument of the functional approach system it seems at first glance
somewhat disappointing. As to form, the authors intend to supplement the
present book by a looseleaf collection of actual forms and other materials.
This e-x'plains the inclusion of only three forms here, but does not explain
why a book with seventy cases and three forms should have been called
"Cases and Materias," nor why the only Reorganization Agreement in-
cluded omitted the accompanying Plan, the skeleton without the meat.
As to substance, one is somewhat surprised at the conventionality of the
book in setting forth merely the cases as they arose from time to time in
the past and in failing to attempt an approach to some of the pressing
problems of the day. Among some of the current subjects I would have
suggested for inclusion, at least by headnotes in the modern case book
manner,7 for the purpose of study and discussion, would have been: (a)
Some method for the complete elimination of receivers, who too frequently
are political parasites and often do little except collect exorbitant fees. (b)
The possibility of reorganization by compelling a small minority to accept
a Plan approved by a large majority of the security holders, with or without
judicial sale, either by a courageous judicial extension of the Rock Island
case 8 and of the recent Coriell case,0 or by legislation. (c) The social advis-
ability of further restricting the right of mortgage and other senior security
holders to wipe out the innocent investors in junior securities whose money
has contributed to the enterprise and the enhancement of the senior securi-
ties at least if the junior interests propose a fair plan for their participa-
tion, either by a bold judicial extension of the Boyd case 2o or by legislation.
7 See for example CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATION FINANCE, an
excellent work by BERLE, another intrepid crusader at Columbia, reviewed
by Professor Ripley (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1220.
8 Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 284 Fed. 945, 28 ALR. 1184 (1922).
9 Coriell v. Morris White, Inc., 54 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
10 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
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(d) The constitutionality of such types of legislation under the due process
and contract clauses and the advisability of repealing or amending the Four-
teenth Amendment and the contract clause, as well as the anti-trust laws, if
they have barred the door to social and economic experimentation or to
legislation which in emergencies may become essential to national presor-
vation."1 (e) Reorganization in bankruptcy instead of in equity. Since the
publication of the book under review there has been introduced in Congress
an amended Bankruptcy Act,12 containing a Reorganization section which
if adopted will, except as to railroads, likely completely revolutionize cor-
porate reorganizations. (f) The increasing cooperative efforts in reorgani-
zations and in the financial difficulties of corporations, such as the interna-
tional Chadbourne Sugar Plan, the National Credit Corporation, the Rail-
road Credit Corporation, the Roosevelt Real-estate Bondholders Protective
Committee in New York, and-a similar committee in Chicago, to mention
some private efforts, as well as numerous governmental efforts, such as the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, whose aid to the railroads and to the
New York mortgage bond houses may make the Government an important
partner in certain future reorganizations.
In no field of the law is there a more crying need for reform. The "re-
organization racket," and the "receivership racket" are terms of daily use
in our press. As this review is being written en route to the Coast, I find,
while passing Chicago, the Chicago Daily Mail in a screaming head-line
across the front page announcing: "Bar Association Opens Receivership
Inquiry," 13 and on the following morning the Los Angeles Examiner pro-
claiming: "Receivership Racket Inquiry on Again Today"1 4 while even
Judge has a Receiver's Number.'5 And now we have protective committees
of reorganization "hijackers" and "chiselers" (occasionally advised by coun-
sel of great eminence), to say nothing of the old fashioned individual
"snipers." No wonder that the public, and particularly the clients who
pay the fees and the expenses of receivers, trustees and committees, and
of their attorneys, and who contemplate with amazement the multitudinous
proceedings in primary and ancillary jurisdictions, frequently conclude that
the entire process is "reorganization for the benefit of lawyers" or "litiga-
tion for revenue only." 16 A contribution to the solution of these problems
is more important than the mere preparation of lawyers for an over-
crowded profession and if the objection is made that such problems can
be dealt with only in a text book and not in a case book, then it is to be
hoped that both the law schools and the profession may be favored with a
supplemental volume by these able authors. In this field where social and
economic pressure is likely shortly to force many changes, Yale Law
School has the opportunity to make a material contribution to the develop-
ment of the law and under the able guidance of Douglas bids fair to seize
that opportunity.
New York City. JosEPH V. KLINE.
1 See dissent of Brandeis in New State Ice Company v. Liebmann, 52
Sup. Ct. 371, U. S. Daily, March 24 and 25, 1932.
12 Senate Bill No. 3866.
1" Chicago Daily Mail, April 26, 1932.
14 Los Angeles Examiner, April 26, 1932.
"Judge, Receiver's Number, April 23, 1932.
1 A term applied in argument by the Hon. John W. Davis to the scan-
dalous Home Mortgage receivership. Ramsey v. Home Mortgage Co., 47 F.
(2d) 621 (E. D. N. C. 1931); r'ev'd 49 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A., 4th, 1931).
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The Law of Shipment. By Louis Otis Van Doren. New York:
Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1932. pp. xlii, 1203. $15.
AN umbrella may be a good umbrella, though it cannot serve as a good
raincoat, tent, or house. The fortunate possessor of a good house, tent, and
raincoat may still find it convenient at times to use an umbrella.
Law books may be of various kinds, each kind'serving a purpose not ade-
quately covered by other kinds of law books. The reporter, the digest, the
encyclopaedia, the treatise, the handbook, the citator, all serve useful pur-
poses in the current practice of law. The treatise or commentary may set
forth the fundamental principles of the topic dealt with, analyse its elements
and discuss the reasons which underlie its application to current contro-
versies. It may seek to identify the interests that are involved and weigh their
relative importance in the light of the human welfare sought to be achieved
in applying the law to the'affairs of practical life. Such a treatise or com-
mentary can be a very useful guide in the process of rationally selecting
from available conflicting decisions or analogies the decision or analogy
properly to be held controlling in novel and puzzling situations brought
about by the progressive developments of our ever-changing world. On the
other hand a law book may be simply a compilation of available authorities
on the topic treated, without attempt at independent analysis or exposition.
Such a book, however, may'serve a useful purpose as a convenient "finder"
of applicable authorities for the practitioner's use, while leaving his guid-
ance in the choice and evaluation of available materials to be derived en-
tirely'from other considerations. Each type of book mentioned manifestly
has its separate uses. That a book of one type does not belong to the other
type need not detract from its usefulness as one of its own type. An um-
brella may still be a good umbrella though it is not a raincoat, a tent, or
a house.
Van Doren's The Law of Shipment is not a treatise or commentary
-which attempts to set forth the fundamental principles of the topic, to
analyse their bases, to test their soundness, and to furnish guidance in
their application to novel controversies. If viewed from that standpoint
this book must inevitably give the impression that the broad outline of
the law is lost in a wilderness of single instances, that the forest can't
be seen because of the trees.
This book manifestly sets out to accomplish a very different purpose.
That purpose is revealed in some of the language "of its preface as being
"to collect and classify reasonably the actual cases" dealing with ship-
ment and with the legal requirements of performance of 'a contract to
ship goods. At page 209, in dealing with F. 0. B. shipment this purpose
is again expressed as follows: "We shall proceed to give a large number
of rulings by the courts on f. o. b. shipment contracts. . . . The subdi-
vision captions will form index headings, and by reference to them *the
student or practitioner will, we hope, be able to find a case on the point
in which he is interested." While other portions of the preface also
speak of presenting the law of shipment in a way and fashion most con-
venient to the practitioner, teacher, or student of law, it is clear 'from
the work itself that the compiler has not attempted to go beyond the
stated purpose to collect 'and classify the cases themselves. Accordingly,
the book constitutes a repository of illustrative instances, with lengthy
extracts from the court opinions in each case, covering the general topics
of how a shipment of goods affects the passing of the property therein
from the seller to the buyer, and what are the requirements for per-
formance of a contract to ship goods. The book sets forth a "total of five
hundred and fifty-seven so-called propositions of law formulated on about
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six hundred cases, most of which are given at considerable length. These
propositions are, for convenience in finding, grouped under general topic
and chapter headings,' but no substantial explanations are attempted in
any instance beyond *the lengthy extracts from the opinions of the cases
themselves. To adopt a golfing figure, this book is not like a systematic
exposition of how to play golf. It is rather like a 'collection of the va-
rious golf clubs conveniently arranged for the player's ready selection in
the instance according to his own judgment of the exigencies encountered
while he is playing his game of golf.
Where the many independent legal propositions which are thus enum-
erated so largely resemble digest paragraphs from individual cases It is
not strange that among them should be included occasional instances in
which independent hnalysis and comparison would have shown the par-
ticular proposition to be ill-considered and unsound. As an 'illustration
may be mentioned the compiler's proposition No. 180, which seems to be
directly contrary to the common law rules regarding reservation of the
property interest as security which are codified in sections 20 and 22 of
the Uniform Sales Act.
The present reviewer in reading 'this book has felt acutely its omis-
sion of any attempt at analysis or explanation, especially on the difficult
and somewhat contentious problems involved in connection with the now
common practice of reserving a security interest in the goods 'on ship-
ment by the seller. The obvious answer to serious criticism of the book
on this score, however, is that the present work was not intended to be
that kind of book. That the article in question is not designed to be a
house, a tent, or a raincoat does not 'prevent its being a good umbrella.
University of Nebraska. LAWRENCE VOLD.
The Interstate Commerce qommissiorn. By I. L. Sharfman. Part
Two. New York: The Commonwealth Fund. 1931. pp. xiv, 489.
$4.50.
THE general scope of this projected series of four volumes was described
in the review of Part One, which appeared in the Yale Law Journal for
December, 1931. The first volume of this study in adminstrative law dealt
'with the legislative basis of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. It accurately described the mode in which Congress progressively
endowed that tribunal with steadily expanding authority. The second vol-
ume analyzes the precise scope of the commissions' jurisdiction. It neces-
sarily deals more with details than the first volume, and sets forth with
some particularity the exact limits of the Commission's jurisdictional au-
thority. It therefore. requires closer perusal than Part One, for it is much
easier to skirt the prominent headlands offshore than to thread the bays
'and inlets which define the boundary between land and water. The marginal
note, accordingly, absorbs a greater portion of the printed page, and arrests
somewhat the ready apprehension of the narrative.
The exposition clusters around three principal themes: the federal regu-
lation of railroads and allied utilities; the incursion of the Commission into
the domain of intrastate commerce; and the Commission's exercise of ad-
;inistrative discretion. Sharfman repeatedly comments, generally with
favor, upon the habitual self-restraint of the Commission in confining its
.activities within the limits of express statutory grants rather than grasp-
-ing after an extension of power by resolving doubtful questions in favor
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of its authority. Its self-denying decision against its powers over water
carriers in the matter of port to port rates is an example.
Sharfman accurately points out the hampering limitation on the Com-
mission in being restrained from fixing the minimum rates which water
carriers must observe, even when carrying freight under a common arrange-
ment with railroads. While the Commission has this power of setting min-
imum rates for rail carriers, it is impotent to restrain the competitive in-
fluence of water carriers as against railroads "under a system of one-sided
control." The discussion of the Commission's regulatory policy as regards
water carriers, express and sleeping-car companies, pipe-line corporations,
private cars and industrial railroads is acute, well-balanced and thorough.
The cautious opinion expressed (p. 54) that the dominant factor in the
denial of fourth section relief to the transcontinental railroads in 1922 was
the absence of proof that the loss of revenue would not jeopardize the fair
return on railroad property as a whole may be seriously questioned. The
more powerful reason was that the proposed rate structure constituted a
violation of section 3 of the Act, in creating an undue and unreasonable
preference or advantage.for Pacific terminals and mid-West points of origin
as against intermountain destinations and originating areas on or near the
Atlantic seaboard.'
The second main division of the volume is devoted to the federal assertion
of power over intrastate commerce. This has not been the bald assertion of
power over intrastate commerce as such, but only as necessary to the com-
plete exercise of federal power over commerce among the states. Sharfman
points out that the chief source of conflict between the federal and the state
regulatory agencies is traceable to the "interaction between the divided
jurisdictional set-up . . . and the organic character of commercial inter-
course" (p. 195). The famous Shreveport case 2 was the entering wedge.
The account of the findings and order in that case (p. 234 sq.) is not prop-
erly implemented in Sharfman's discussion until, at a later page (276), it
is noted that the scale of mileage rates prescribed by the Commission was
essentially the scale set by the Texas authorities. Until after the passage
of the Transportation Act of 1920, however, Sharfman finds evidence of a
wise adminstrative restraint on the Commission's part, even when it essayed
the incidental control of state rates, necessary to prevent such prejudice
against definitely defined interstate commerce as is forbidden by section 3
of the Act. After the passage of the act of 1920 which signalized the com-
plete occupancy by Congress of the field of railroad security regulation and
intercorporate relations, Sharfman finds two of the Commission's policies
vulnerable. He thinks the Commission erred by defect in not asserting
exclusive jurisdiction over consolidations; and that in the matter of fixing
intrastate rates and charges, it erred by excess, and is fairly chargeable
with a "ruthless invasion of the domain of the states" (p. 339). The latter
is rather a severe criticism of the Commission, especially when he himself
admits that "these proceedings accomplished results essential to the national
interest, and that the sweeping power asserted in their disposition was
sustained by the Supreme Court" (p. 339). He commends the subsequent
change in the Commission's attitude, in inviting the cooperation of the
state commissions in the joint consideration of cases involving state rates
assailed as discriminating against interstate commerce. There is another
aspect of this policy of relaxation however. Some of the state commis-
sioners are elective officials, and are swayed largely by political motives.
See Transcontinental Cases of 1922, 74 I. C. C. 48, 82, 83 (1922).




Their sitting in argument in an alleged advisory capacity with the federal
commission, and their participation in the conference for the disposition of
disputed cases in which they are interested parties may verge closely on a
merger of the functions of judge and, advocate. There are those who feel
that the later tendency of the Commission to withhold a remedial order
and to remit to the state commission the proper rate adjustment, when the
record admittedly discloses a violation of section 13 of the present act, and
the existence of state rates discriminating against interstate commerce, is
not so much a praise-worthy instance of administrative restraint, as a lax
tendency to compromise with expediency.
The third main subdivision of the volume deals with the Commission's
exercise of administrative discretion. Its legislative mandates are couched in
!such terms as "just and reasonable," "compatible with the public interest,"
and the like. These unmistakably imply the Congressional intent to vest
lirge areas of discretion in the Commission. In general, the Supreme Court
has held the Commission free from interference in matters purely of admin-
istrative discretion, and subject to judicial review only as regards the exer-
cise of administrative power. It has even enlarged the Commission's powers
in this field by according to it exclusive- primary jurisdiction in the Abiletto
case,3 and in exempting its negative orders from judicial review.4 Sharf-
man questions the soundness of the latter decision. If, however, when the
Commission finds on the record no violation of the Act and dismisses the
complaint, court review is to attach to determine whether the Commission
erred in finding no violation, the correlative infirmity must attach to an
affirmative order granting relief, where the court would be entitled to pais
on whether the Commission had not erred in granting such relief. To be
sure, affirmative orders are already subject to judicial review on grounds
of error of law; but the question is whether still another ground of judicial
review would not be opened on questions of fact where ordinarily the Com-
mission's findings are not now set aside by the courts. In general, Sharf-
man concludes, we think rightly, that ". ..the judicial restrictions im-
posed upon the exercise of administrative discretion tend to be confined
... to questions of legal power" (p. 452).
The concluding topic of the volume has to do with the maintenance of the
Commission's independence. Private interests have not as yet swerved the
Commission "from paths of disinterested public service" (p. 452). The
post-war records of the executive and Congress on the contrary show re-
peated attempts to sulbvert the Commission's independent status. The ma-
nipulation of appointive power by the President, the Senatorial action on
confirmation especially in the Esch case, the Hoch-Smith resolution, the
Interchangeable Mileage Ticket Act, and the attempt to secure the passage
of an act to remove the Pullman surcharge, all illustrate the dangerous
tendency to deflect the Commission's action in aid of purely private interests.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court in two instances at least, has thwarted the
insidious attempts to undermine the Commission's independence.
The high standard of the first volume is maintained in Part Two, and
affords a good augury for the two remaining volumes of the series.
Yale University. "VINTHROP M. DANIELS.
3 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27
Sup. Ct. 350 (1907).
4 Proctor and Gamble v. U. S., 225 U. S. 282, 32 Sup. Ct. 761 (1912).
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International Legisltion. Edited by Manley 0. Hudson. Volume
I, 1919-1921; volume II, 1922-1924. Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. 1931. pp. c xviii, 786; xix,
787-1544.
SINcE the World War there has been a great development in two conflicting
tendencies in international affairs. On the one hand, nationalism has been
intensified and nationalistic legislation such as high tariffs-almost always
destructive of that international comity and co-operation which should char-
acterize the relations of nations-has been increased. On the other hand,
the tendency of nations to co-operate in the solution of common problems
has also increased. At least the nations have been forced by the complexity
of the modern world, due to the scientific progress of the last hundred years,
to seek around the conference table solutions for a great variety of problems.
This has resulted in a number of treaties, conventions, protocols, and other
agreements by which the relations of the nations have been regulated. This
movement has been greatly epedited by the existence of the League of Na-
tions with its regular meetings of the representatives of the various na-
tions. The agreements reached at the numerous conferences are what the
editor of the work under review has called "international legislation." He
objects to the habit of referring to treaties as contracts between nations
and feels that the term "international legislation" more accurately describes
an instrument which makes a law to govern the relations of states.
This growth in the number of international instruments by the confer-
ence method has really been but the expansion of a tendency prevalent
during the fifty years preceding the World War. This is clearly shown by
the list of such agreements arising between 1864 and 1914 set forth by
the editor in the introduction of the present work.
The purpose of this work is to make various multipartite international
instruments originating during the ten years from June 28, 1919, the date
of the signing of the Treaty of Versailies, to June 28, 1929, "readily acces-
sible to the legal profession" and "to direct attention to the results of the
process of international legislation." The editor has brought together all
such international instruments which, in his opinion, have a legislative
character and a permanent or gneral interest. The two volumes here under
review cover the period from 1919 to 1924.
Since the only test of the eligibility of an instrument was its legislative
character and the fact that it was of general interest, many are included
which were never put into force. These were included, the editor e-\plains,
because they may yet become effective or because they contain suggestions
which may guide future efforts in the legislative field.
Notes of the editor, in most cases, contain a brief explanation of the
instrument, indicate whether and to what extent it has been ratified, give
the source from which the text was taken, and contain a brief bibliography.The peace treaties of 1919, 1920, and 1923, have been omitted because
"they are easily available elsewhere and because so many of their provi-
sions are not of general application." For similar reasons some other
agreements dealing with frontiers and problems of local interest were
omitted. It seems to the reviewer that the omission of the peace treaties
was a mistake. Since one of the chief values of a work of this kind is that
it makes the source material easily available for the student and practi-
tioner it seems that it would have improved the usefulness of these volumes
to have included these treaties. Certainly these treaties were legislative in
the sense that they are determining in a vital way the relations of nations,
and since they do so determine, it is necessary to refer to them frequently.
In order to enable one to trace more easily the progress of international
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legislation the editor has arranged the instruments in chronological order
except where an instrument has been altered by a liter agreement. Where
this has occurred the latter agreement follows the original immediately.
The advantage of this is obvious. The choice of the chronological order is
more open to question. There is, however, a list of the documents classified
according to subject matter which will serve well the purpose of an ar-
rangement according to subject.
In most cases the texts of the instruments are printed in parallel columns
in both French and English, these being the languages most often used in
international conferences especially those held under the auspices of the
League of Nations. But Spanish is also used in some cases where it was
one of the languages in which the agreement was originally drafted.
The editor has written an introduction of some sixty pages in which he
discusses in his usual scholarly manner the nature of international legisla-
tion and some of the technical problems connected with the conference
method of expanding the field of public international law. The amount of
such legislation is truly impressive and will no doubt continue to increase,
The fact that it will increase as the world becomes more and more complex
and the destinies of nations become more closely intertwined will make the
book a useful one, for these laws will serve as guides to future measures.
University of Kentucky. E. G. TRIMBLE.
The Judicial Process in Tort Cases. By Leon Green. St. Paul:
West Publishing Co. 1931. pp. xx, 1900. $7.50.
Probably ever reviewer of a case-book has either said or wanted to say
that his review should be postponed until he should have taught a class with
the book in question. It would be even better to review a case-book only after
seeing the author teach with it. A case-book is primarily a pedagogical tool
designed by the teacher for his own purposes. In his hands it may be used
with efficacy and skill in presenting his attitudes toward law. Since there
is no possibility of my studying this book under Dean Green, I have, by
substituting imagination for experience tried to find what the book is
designed to do and whether it seems well designed for the purpose.
It is difficult to understand the purposes of this casebook without a careful
reading of Dean Green's Judge and Jury. There, in his chapter on The
Palsgraf Case, after discussing the "formula of 'forseeability'," he says,
"But whatever formulas or theories may be employed in a case, they tell
little as to why they are used; that is as to why a court decides as it does.
(p. 261.] . . . But there are factors which do operate to control judg-
ment. They may lie deep or near the surface. More frequently they are not
hard to discover. They are found aligned differently in different types of
cases [p. 262.] Legal science ought to be able to devise neater terms
for phrasing its problems and articulating its processes. It will do so when
it gives over the hope that it can subject the world of life to control by a
few 'pat' phrases and formulas. The science of law deserves a dignity that
comes from a more rational technique." [p. 267.] What shall that technique
be? This case-book seems to be an attempt to answer that question.
Its general plan appears to be predicated on the hypothesis that, in the
main, courts deal with cases on a basis of fact categories, using various
devices to achieve similar results. The first chapter attempts to demonstrate
this almost at the outset. Under the general chapter heading of Threats,
Insults, Blows, Attacks, Wounds, Fights, Restraints, etc., we find sections
dealing with "Firearms," in which the cases show that the courts insist
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on high standards of care when injuries are caused by such weapons;
with "Protection of Property," in which the cases establish the familiar
limitations imposed on one defending only his property; with "Dealings
with Customers and Employees," in which the thesis to be developed is not
clear; and with "Play, Practical Jokes, and Conduct with Reference to
Women." Although this heading leads one to suspect the author of a
roughly humorous intent, his thesis as to the latter part of this section is
serious enough. The arrangement seems planned to show that in the
"fright" or "mental suffering" eases the successful plaintiffs are women.
The author emphasizes this in a footnote which reads in part, "There are
very few cases, if any, in which adult men have been allowed recovery for
injuries resulting from fear, etc., unaccompanied by physical impact."
[p. 126, n. 59.] On this I shall comment later.
Chapter 2 deals with "Surgical Operations; Treatment, Control, etc., of
Sick, Disabled and Irresponsible Persons." The cases develop the various
doctrines which courts have used in these situations--the importance of
the patient's consent, that emergencies may obviate the need of consent, the
standards of skill required of physicians, the protection accorded to errors
in professional judgment, and conflicting views as to the liability of chari-
table institutions for the negligencd of nurses and doctors.' Other cases
in this group illustrate one's duty toward a sick guest, a sick employee, a
trespasser run down on a railroad track without fault, and what is required
of a son seeking to restrain an irresponsible father. Preceding these last
four cases are two which I should like to have seen placed at the end of
this chapter. One deals with the liability for harm done by an insane person
negligently paroled by the defendant, the other with the non-liability of a
lessee of convicts for a rape committed by a convict negligently allowed to
escape. Arranged as suggested, these cases would come right before the
chapter on Animals and one might easily construct analogies between insane
persons, convicts long deprived of normal satisfactions and animals.
Chapter 4 deals with Occupancy, Ownership, Development of Land; the
first section being Neighbouring Owners and Occupiers, with subsections on
Fire, Water, Various Developments Upon, and Uses of, Adjoining Lands
(principally cases of "nuisance"), and Trees, Noxious Growths, Fences.
Section 2 deals with Persons Using Ways, Streets. Section 3 deals with
Persons on the Premises of Others and it is here that the author again
clearly reveals his general purpose by the manner in which he handles the
"attractive nuisance" cases. Starting with the Stout case, he presents the
opposite view in the next case. The author's attitude toward these cases is
revealed in a footnote on page 503, the last lines of which read, "An under-
standing of the decisions is more nearly to be derived from a study of the
risks and factors present in the particular case than on any other basis. The
attempts at broad doctrinal generalizations both for and against responsi-
bility in these cases have produced many doubtful decisions." A few page3
later, after including two cases in one of which an infant, and in the other
an adult is injured by high tension wires, his footnote explains that "The
responsibility of power companies for children who are injured by coming
into contact with wires, etc., on the premises of the company is usually
placed upon the 'turn-table' or 'attractive nuisance' doctrine. But the doctrine
is here extended in three particulars: (1) the negligence formula employed
is normally expressed as requiring a 'high degree of care' or 'the highest
degree of care,' etc.; (2) the 'anticipation' required is easily satisfied; (3)
Z The Iulliner case, p. 196, 144 AIlinn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920), is an
admirable exposition of the views opposed to those in SchloendorfF v. Society
of New York Hospital at p. 190, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
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the age at which the child will be held to be capable of contributory negli-
gence is set at a higher limit." [p. 521, n. 99.]
To deal with the foregoing for the moment, leaving some of the later
parts of the book to illustrate other points, what, in brief, seems to be the
purpose in arranging cases in this fashion? Perhaps it is this. Courts must
dispose of cases. For this purpose many devices are available. With a
variety of devices at their command, it is not as important to determine
how judges dispose of problems as why. The real reasons are rarely, if
ever, explicit. May we not discover an explanation as to why courts decide
as they do by gathering the cases under fact categories rather than under
categories of legal concepts? This, in my opinion, is worth trying. The
tendency of modern legal thought is in this general direction. It was thrust
under our noses years ago when courts began to differentiate between pro-
fessional and non-professional sureties. Cases of the latter type gave little
or no idea of how courts would react toward a surety company. The attempt
to erect rational and tenable fact categories in the tort field may prove
fruitless. We may find ourselves driven to the absurdity of distinguishing
between the overhanging branches of pear trees and of apple trees. I doubt
it. If the fact groupings can be made reasonably broad, the effort seems
worth while.
If I understand the author's purpose, he hopes by this book to lead its
users away from the traditional classification of tort cases. He puts the
cases in a new set of boxes. le wants us to see the need of dealing with
certain occurrences and social relationships according to their social im-
portance and not according to whether they fit into certain legal abstrac-
tions that have no existence except in the minds of the legal profession. If
this should result in the setting up of a non-legal criterion for judicial
decisions, it is possible that in creating such a criterion a "more rational
technique" might be discovered-than exists at present. 2
Does this book naturally lend itself to conveying these ideas to students?
As to this, I am doubtful. For example, the "shock" and "mental suffering"
cases are apparently intended to show that only women recover in these
cases. Certainly a student would get this impression. The natural implica-
tion is that if men are injured by shock alone they will not recover. While
it is true that in few, if any, of the cases involving shock the plaintiffs have
been men this merely confirms the general belief that men are less delicately
organized than women and hardly justifies the implication that if a man
were thus injured he would not recover. Other groupings might advan-
tageously be wider. Instead of "Firearms," for instance, one might sug-
gest "Explosives," or "Extra-hazardous Activities," and include the dyna-
mite cases in the recent oil-well case in California.3 The inclusion of such
cases would enable the student to see more clearly that the determinative
factor which is responsible for the stringent attitude of the courts in these
cases is the extra-hazardous nature of the activity and not the fact that a
pistol or a gun was the instrument of harm.
Furthermore, all the cases of fraud, deceit, and negligent misrepresenta-
2See Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism (1931) 41 YALn
L. J. 201. It does not seem a valid criticism of Dr. Cohen's thesis to say
that by transferring the problem from law to ethics nothing is gained be-
cause the difficulties are moved into another field. There is a great advan-
tage in becoming aware of the fact that a judge who rests on stare decisis
is making a decision ethical in its nature or at least in its effects. Intellec-
tual development usually consists in becoming aware of and being able to
articulate what previously was unconscious and unexpressed.




tion are put under "Sales and Credit Transactions." The failure to include
other cases of fraud involving such things as releases secured by fraud,
cases in which the plaintiff has been fraudulently induced to allow the
statute of limitations to run against a claim, and cases where one has been
induced to enter into a supposed marriage by fraud and deceit, may cause
the student to miss the dominant fact in fraud cases, namely, that the
plaintiff has been misled to his injuiry by the defendant's deception. The
suggestion that one's right to recover for fraud and deceit is limited to
sales and credit transactions is likely to mislead the student as to the real
basis of recovery.
If future judges are to reach new results we must stimulate the imagi-
nation of our students. Our present judges find analogies most helpful in
this respect. The MacPherson ease glows with imaginative jurisprudence.
Afore of such imagination is needed and it can be stimulated by the law
teacher. By grouping a variety of cases under reasonably wide categories
the possibility of helpful analogies can be vividly suggested. I regret that
Enfield vs. Colburn4 is omitted. This case is an excellent example of the
dangers of thinking in limited terms.
I was somewhat startled to find the Palsgraf case buried among "Traffic
and Transportation" on page 1054. This is, of course, wholly consistent
with the author's views on that case as expressed in his Judge and Jurj.5
I share his implicit hope that its doctrine will be limited to those cases in
which the court properly wishes to curtail liability. I fear it will not be
so used. The inclusion of its doctrine in the Restatement of Torts may have
far reaching effects and serve to limit liability in many instances where
liability might be advantageously imposed. The phrase "zone of danger"
connotes a limitation of space, warranted perhaps by the facts of that case,
but which would have unfortunate effects in other situations.6 But, again,
my chief objection to the inclusion of this case in the category of "Traffic
and Transportation" is the implication that the controlling element in the
decision was the fact that this was a railroad ease. From the usual attitude
of courts toward railroad passengers one would normally have supposed the
opposite result. It is more likely that the unusual and unex\pected manner
in which the injury was caused was the controlling factor in the case rather
than the fact that it took place on a railway platform.
I would face a first year class with considerable timidity with a book of
1900 pages. I believe first year students make the most satisfactory prog-
ress by dealing with a few eases thoroughly, especially in the first three
months. Thereafter, they seem able to absorb a considerable number of
cases rather rapidly. The author's teaching method is doubtless adapted
to this common experience.
If this book is proving satisfactory to Dean Green and his classes, it has
4 63 N. H. 218 (1884). A sued B for the cost of investigating a false
claim fraudulently made by B. The court said there was no reliance by A.
If reliance means motivation by a belief in the truth of the claim the result
is inevitable. Mlight it not mean motivation by the presentation of a claim?
Confronted with a false claim, A must either investigate, defend, or pay
something-any alternative costs him time or money.
5 Chapter 8.
6 If D negligently kills X in China and a cablegram announcing his death
is received by his mother in New York and she suffers physical injury from
the shock, the phrase "zone of danger" would effectively bar recovery by
the mother. "Promate cause" would be equally effective today. But the
time may come when courts may wish to extend liability to this natural
and expectable situation. If so, I feel "proximate cause" will prove more
elastic than "zone of danger."
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met the most important test of any case book. I hope I have understood.
his purpose in constructing it. Those teachers whose attitudes toward law
and law teaching are akin to Dean Green's may find the book stimulating
and useful. No one can hope or should wish that all law teachers will
think alike.
Columbia University. JAMES P. GIFFORD.
Race, Class mL Party: A History of Negro Suffrage a"d White
Politics in the South. By Paul Lewinson. New York: Oxford
University Press. 1932. pp. x, 302. $3.75.
A MONOGRAPH ought to be explicit in title as well as in text. The present
book fits its sub-title admirably; the main title smacks of smartness and
impertinence in the publisher's office, and would better have been suppressed.
It may be suspected also that the publisher is responsible for placing the
footnote enrichment in the back of the book, which requires a studious
reader to turn frequently from one part of the volume and seek related
matter in another. These things are an annoyance, not an injury. The wor1c
remains an effective historical analysis of a special, regional snarl in Ameri-
can "democracy."
The author is unsatisfying only on a few small points. His use of the
term "Bourbon" is persistent but not unchangeable. Finding the word
indispensable, which I hope it is not, he might well have defined.it. Many
mere phrases are put into quotation marks which have a general enough,
usage to require no such distinction. On the other hand quotations of
substantial dimensions are eschewed. This is well enough except where
something obscure might be better illuminated by adding illustration to
analysis. The lily-white faction of the Republican party is a case in point.
The movement is proved to have interest and importance, yet it is left a
little vague by default of expressions which might have been drawn from
participants.
The book is complex, because a main purpose of it is to show that South-
ern politics have a fundamental complexity under a superficial simplicity.
The racial castes, the social strata, the strength of tradition and habitua-
tion, the diversity of economic interest (in which the sugar business and
the delta demand for tariff protection to long-staple cotton might have been
given more notice), the differentiation of affairs in the several states, the
impingement of national impulses and other innovations, have brought, am
demonstrated, endless variety of personal reactions and a pulsing and
pausing in politics.
The solid south has more than a glacier's motion. It is rather like an
ice-bound stream with a current and a due number of eddies under a
solidified and concealing surface. Mr. Lewinson has removed sections of
the crust, gauged the current and analysed the quality of the water. He
-functions in the temper and with the purpose of a scientist, not as a par-
tisan of anything unless it be decency, toleration and intelligence.
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The Exduhnge of Minarities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. By
Stephen P. Ladas. New York: Macmillan. 1932. pp. xi, 849.
$6.
THE Paris peace conference imposed the Minorities Treaties upon the new
and enlarged states in order to secure racial, religious and linguistic minori-
ties against oppression and discrimination by the ruling majorities. But
the virulent hatreds of the Balkans appeared to demand more than interna-
tional guarantees, and the astute Greek leader, Venizelos, proposed the
reciprocal emigration of Greeks from Bulgaria and of Bulgars from Greece.
The "Committee on New States and for the Protection of the Rights of
Minorities" sought to extend the plan to include Serbia as -well. But the
latter refused to co-operate, and the original proposal of the Greek states-
man was accepted. The settlement with the Turks in 1923 provided for a
similar exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey.
The provisions of the conventions which regulated the exchange of
minorities and particularly the methods employed in removing and settling
the masses of people affected, constitute the subject matter of the volume
under review. Part I minutely analyzes tl~e plans and practices of the
commission which supervised the Greco-Bulgar exchange. Part II similarly
treats the reciprocal transplantation of Greeks and Turks. The settlement
of the immigrants and refugees in their adopted countries is described
more briefly in Part I. The essential documents are made available in
appendices which cover nearly one hundred pages. An informative introduc-
tion and a reasoned conclusion complete the bulky volume.
With much industry the author has sifted the sources; he has relied
chiefly upon the unpublished Procis-Verbaux of the Mixed Commissions
which directed the removal of the minorities; he has read the pertinent
League documents; he has consulted the most recent works touching on his
subject; he has even sought out the minutes of the Committee on New
States, though he seems unaware of the publication of these minutes in the
treasure-house of the Peace Conference-the Diary of David Hunter Miller.
The migration of about two million people would make a thrilling story
for scholars and the general public alike. But this volume will probably be
read only by the former. The human element does not figure prominently
in the study. Mr. Ladas is concerned with the legal and administrative
aspects of the problem. He has viewed the movement from above;' from
the directing commissions, from the League reports, from the plans of
governments. We get here and there a glimpse of the privations endured
by the wanderers, of the reaction of the latter to the removal from their
native countries, of the reception accorded the newcomers by their national
kinsmen. But the major preoccupation of the author is with the composition
and agencies of the Mixed Commissions; with the plans formulated; with
the definition of the classes of people subject to exchange; with the stupen-
dous task of appraising and liquidating the abandoned immovable property;
with the attempts to compensate the emigrants. All of these difficult ques-
tions Mr. Ladas has handled well, though at times one wishes that he had
relegated some of the material to the footnotes. The main current of the
story would then have run more smoothly and the work would have gained
in vividness and lucidity.
Was the radical experiment in dealing with minorities a success and is
it likely to serve as a precedent for similar action elsewhere? Mr. Ladas
is far from enthusiastic over the achievements of the directing Mixed Com-
missions. The Greco-Turkish Mixed Commission did not even attempt to
compensate the emigrants for properties left behind. The exchanged Greek-
Bulgarian minorities were indemnified, but they received payment chiefly
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in bonds which depreciated from one-third to one-half of their face value.
In both cases the governments were obliged to extend relief to the helpless
immigrants.
Moreover, a large proportion of the exchanged population had fled the
native countries before the conventions went into effect. The "exchange"
was therefore largely the confirmation of an accomplished fact. Those who
did remove as a result of the agreements did so largely through compulsion.
The Greco-Turkish agreement was frankly compulsory. The Greco-Bul-
garian convention stipulated freedom of action for the persons concerned,
but in practice much pressure was applied. The simple peasant folk clung
to the soil of their ancestors and were loath to abandon their homes and to
endure unknown hardships even for the sake of national homogeneity. Many
of the Turkish Greeks who had sought refuge abroad desired to return to
their homes. [p. 340.] The Turks in Greece wanted to be left alone; there
were even cases of Greek Moslems who embraced Christianity in order to
escape deportation. [p. 391 n.] In view of these facts it would seem that
Mr. Ladas attaches too much importance to the deterring influence of the
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization upon the Bulgarian resident, in
Greece. [pp. 104, 123.1
The consequences of the Balkan experiment cannot as yet be conclusively
ascertained. The three states affected have indeed become more homo-
geneous. But Greeks were not expelled from Constantinople nor Moslems
from Western Thrace. Many thousands of Bulgarians also remain in
Greece. The protective guaranties of the Minorities Treaties can therefore
not be dispensed with. Furthermore, the supply of land in Greece is in-
sufficient, and the unnatural growth of Greek cities and towns is, in the
view of Mr. Ladas, both dangerous and unhealthy Turkey, on the other
hand, has lost in the Greeks an enterprising middle-class which cannot
easily be replaced. The drama would indeed end in an ironic anticlimax if
Greek "surplus population" were soon to seek and find a home in Turkey.
The College of the City of New York. OSCAa I. JANOWSKY.
The Law of Patents for Chemists. By Joseph Rossman. Wash-
ington: The Inventor's Publishing Co. 1932. pp. ix, 304. $3.50.
WITH the increasing interest of chemists and their employers in securing
the material benefits of patent protection for their developments in the field
of industrial chemistry, Dr. Rossman's publication, The Law of Patents
for Chemists, fills a decided need in bringing together the principles peculiar
to the practice in obtaining patents relating to chemistry. The diverse types
of so-called "chemical patents" including processes involving the use of
chemicals in altering the properties of materials or converting them into
new substances, and the products themselves, whether they be new com-
pounds or merely mechanical mixtures having new properties, are discus(ed
in his book.
This book merits the careful consideration of every research chemist
desiring the benefits of patent protection for himself or his employer,
especially those chemists not already thoroughly experienced in patent
matters. It is written in as simple language as this highly technical subject
permits and takes into consideration the fact that the ordinary chemist,
having received substantial training only in scientific lines, knows little or
nothing about the nature of patent rights and the legal terms peculiar to
patent law. It sets out the general principles of patent law and practice,
and illustrates them with many examples taken from actual decisions and
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